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Abstract: Financial regulators in many states recently have obtained statuory 
mandates to enhance consumer financial literacy. This paper 
investicages the development of policy pursuant to such mandates in 
the UK and Canada to identify how national regulators in both 
countries represent financial market place. It finds that regulators in 
both countries represent financial education as empowerment and 
responsible consumer behaviour. The paper rekates the tension 
between empowerment and responsibilization aspects of literacy 
enhancement to policy goals of expectations of protection. It raises 
questions about regulators' use of consumer education to 
responsiblize consumption of financial products and calls for further 
research on the international growth of financial literacy education as 
a regulatory project.  
Keywords:  n/a 
 
 
Modernity cannot be comprehended without understanding regulation. . . . 
The global perspective . . . reframes individuals as subjects as well as objects of 
regulation. . . . Understanding modernity . . . demands the study of plural webs 
of many kinds of actors which regulate while being regulated themselves. 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 10–11) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the combined forces of global 
economic integration processes and financial crises spurred restructuring of 
financial firms and stimulated reforms to international and domestic regulation 
of financial services markets. Changes to the regulatory architecture in many 
jurisdictions produced new agencies and novel statutory powers (Briault 
1999; Ferran 2003). Regulatory reform may draw on distinct local histories, 
politics, and institutional imperatives, but changes in the global setting of 
these reforms have produced similarities. One notable similarity is the emergence 
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in several states of new mandates for national governments to educate, as 
well as protect, financial consumers (OECD 2005a). Acting on these mandates, 
regulators have begun to promote financial literacy education, intending to 
change how consumers behave. 
 
Proponents often cast financial literacy education as a form of consumer 
empowerment, using empowerment to mean reducing barriers to participation 
in markets and improving the accessibility of relevant information (e.g., 
Cartwright 2004; Fox, Bartholomae & Lee 2005; Howells 2005). Seen from 
this perspective, financial education works in concert with consumer protection 
measures to improve decision-making skills and enable individuals to 
make use of remedies such as disclosure and reflection rights. More critical 
explanations view financial education as responding to the interests of 
states and firms in expanding consumer markets for financial products, and 
as facilitating a shift from the state to the individual of responsibility for 
personal economic security (Froud et al. 2006; Odih & Knights 1999). 
Financial literacy education features in these explanations not so much as 
consumer empowerment but rather as an instance of responsibilization, a 
form of regulation by which the state holds individuals accountable for 
aspects of market governance and social security that it used to provide.1 
Responsibilization has a more complicated relationship with standard 
consumer protection measures than does the notion of empowerment. Although 
sometimes promoted as strengthening autonomy, responsibilization increases 
individuals’ exposure to risk and acts on individual consciousness in ways 
that may conflict with traditional conceptions of consumer sovereignty. 
Drawing on these themes of market expansion, consumer empowerment, 
and individual responsibilization, this article critically analyses UK and 
Canadian policy discourse on financial education. Descriptively, the analysis 
identifies how regulators in these states represent the behavior they seek to 
promote and their visions of the role of the literate consumer in the contemporary 
financial marketplace. More critically, I compare regulators’ accounts of the 
goals of financial education with economic justifications for consumer protection 
measures and with findings from behavioral research on individual decisionmaking. 
 
This analysis exposes contradictions related to the idea of consumer 
sovereignty and provides reasons to question the feasibility of deploying 
financial education to influence consumers and, through them, financial markets. 
 
While the article refers to recent financial literacy initiatives and policy 
outputs in Canada and the UK, it concentrates on how regulators’ texts 
represent consumer education. This focus on representations stems from the 
premise that policymakers do not simply observe problems that regulatory 
action purports to solve, but through their communications actively contribute 
to dominant understandings of perceived needs for regulatory action. How 
they interpret the problem of financial illiteracy and communicate the goals 
of financial education are therefore significant dimensions of their policy 
activities (Yeung 2005). Another reason to pay close attention to policy 
discourses is the pre-eminence of consumer empowerment claims in the 
financial education literature, which tends to orient its critical questions 
towards the efficacy of particular initiatives rather than the aspirations 
of the regulatory project (e.g., Brennan & Ritters 2004; Klemme 2002). 
This focus may obscure the extent to which financial literacy measures 
purport to advance other objectives, such as changing individual 
understandings about the appropriate role of the state in social welfare or 
modifying consumer expectations of firms and regulators. By examining 
policy makers’ accounts of the purposes of financial literacy development, 
this article illuminates the complexity of regulatory goals and draws 
attention to potentially contradictory aspects of educational interventions 
(Gross 2003, 2005). Part II outlines the rise of financial literacy education as a  
Regulatory project, situates it in the context of decentered regulation and elaborates on 
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the key themes of market expansion, empowerment, and responsibilization. 
Part III describes the development of financial literacy education policies in 
Canada and the UK, and analyses the regulators’ policy documents in the 
light of these themes. Part IV reflects on the findings and explores some of 
their implications for financial consumers and for regulation in this field. 
Part V is a short conclusion. 
 
II. THE RISE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION AS A REGULATORY 
PROJECT 
 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY ON THE PUBLIC POLICY 
AGENDA 
 
Neither anxiety about consumer skills nor interest in consumer education is 
a new entrant on the terrain of public policy (Kyrk 1923; Mitchell 1950; 
Parr 1999). Consumer education has featured in debates about consumer 
protection policy since early in the twentieth century, while organizations 
providing quasi-educational services, such as debt counselling and financial 
advice, populate the nongovernmental sectors of several states (Braucher 2003; 
Gross 2003). Recent developments differ from these examples, however, 
insofar as regulators, who traditionally have focused on governing behavior 
on the supply side of financial markets, deploy education systematically to 
change consumer demand. 
 
This approach to consumer education extends the work of securities 
regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which in 1993 established an Office of Investor Education and Assistance to 
provide advice on investing “wisely” and avoiding fraud (Fanto 1998). 
Subsequent initiatives of the SEC and other securities regulators produced 
investor education programs offering “tips and traps” advice and information 
about disclosure rights. Regulators may have based these programs on 
mandates to promote investor confidence in securities markets, but their 
educational activities tended to be ad hoc and responsive to scandals and 
scams (Fanto 1998). To the extent that there existed a nascent conception of a 
more general educational role for financial regulators, it emphasized helping 
investors to give effect to their established preferences through such measures 
as better access to information. Unlike financial firms who turned to 
financial education from the late 1980s to increase product sales, financial 
regulators engaged in relatively little “cheerleading” education to promote 
investment as good practice for everyone, nor did they otherwise seek to 
inculcate savings and investment norms amongst the general populations in 
their jurisdictions (Fanto 1998: 162). 
 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century a discernable shift had occurred, 
establishing the main elements of current policy discourse. “Consumers” 
replaced “investors” as the focus of attention as concerns about individuals’ 
financial skills expanded to encompass consumption of products such as 
credit, insurance, savings, and general banking services; and financial 
consumers became positioned as targets, as well as beneficiaries, of states’ 
financial educational initiatives (OECD 2004, 2005a). Aspiring to do more 
than improve access to information, some financial regulators began to focus 
on consumers’ roles in financial markets, seeking to influence their thinking 
about financial circumstances and needs, to encourage development of a 
taste for financial property, and to support acquisition of the skills required 
to perform confidently in financial markets. 
 
In addition, recent policy discourse often frames financial illiteracy as a 
problem that engages national interests in the performance of domestic 
financial markets and represents financial education as vital to the health 
of national economies. A recent OECD report, for example, asserts that 
higher levels of financial literacy will improve economic growth and help 
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to reduce poverty in all economies and potentially moderate the volatility 
of financial markets in so-called “emerging economies” (OECD 2005a: 35). 
Sometimes, the direct benefits to consumers appear almost as an 
afterthought, as in the mandate of an Australian taskforce, which describes 
the goals of a national financial literacy strategy as to: “reduce poverty, 
increase economic performance, bolster national savings and create 
well-informed consumers” (Australia. Consumer and Financial Literacy Task 
Force 2004). 
 
B. THE ECONOMIC SETTING: GLOBALIZATION AND THE EXPANSION OF 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
These shifts in policy discourse occurred in the shadow of global economic 
restructuring processes that have expanded markets for consumer financial 
products and stimulated the rise of a neoliberal model of economic development 
(Harvey 2005; Soederberg, Menz & Cerny 2005). Social change wrought by 
this model has affected both the demand for and supply of consumer financial 
products. Flexibilization of labor markets has made employment more 
insecure, while interstate competition to attract or keep capital investment 
has led to policies that limit states’ capacities to deliver economic security 
and provide social services.2 
 
Together these effects have transformed workercitizenship 
entitlements to social welfare into privatized needs for products 
to finance personal care and development, smooth incomes over time, and 
manage risk. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in relation 
to pension provision, which is frequently cited as one of the main reasons for 
states’ burgeoning interests in financial literacy (e.g., FSA 2002b; OECD 2004). 
At the same time, technological change and deregulatory policies have 
speeded up the pace at which money circulates and capital flows into and 
out of national economies and spawned large financial firms in search of ways 
to increase demand for their products (Briault 1999; Strange 1998). Firms 
have found it easier to grow demand for some products than for others. Unlike 
revolving consumer credit, for example, which firms may promote as a means 
to enjoy a desirable consumer lifestyle, savings and investment products 
appear have been more difficult to mass-market within a system of tax-funded 
public services. Just as cuts to such services may create new financial needs, 
so too may public education policies stimulate consumer demand by heightening 
individuals’ consciousness of such needs and the capacity of different financial 
products to meet them. Capitalizing on this aspect of consumer education, 
financial firms have supplemented traditional product marketing with programs 
to increase public awareness and usage of financial products. Citigroup, for 
example, expanded the educational work of its pre-merger firms with the 
launch of a ten-year program to spend at least US$200 million on promoting 
financial literacy throughout the world (Citigroup 1998–2006) while Visa, 
active in U.S. schools since 1995, has created financial education programs for 
adults and children in Europe and North America, South American states, 
the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific region (Visa 2006). Financial 
firms market products to adults through quasi-educational activities such as 
investment exhibitions and clubs; they fund young investor competitions, 
promote financial skills training for children, and sponsor awards for 
youth organizations (Girl Scouts 2005; Harmes 2001; Stanford 2002). 
Complementing direct delivery of their financial educational schemes, 
some firms have sought also to “place financial education firmly on the 
public policy agenda” (Citizens Advice Bureau & Prudential plc 2005: 2), 
sponsoring research and lobbying for the inclusion of financial education in 
the work of state regulators and educational authorities.3 
 
One ambitious initiative is the OECD financial education project, described by its sponsor, 
Prudential plc, as “a significant three-year international research programme 
[to] guide policymakers and regulators around the world who have the task 
of implementing financial education strategies” (Prudential plc 2005: 10). 
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This project has published a substantial report on the state of financial literacy 
around the world and a policy statement on best practices for the promotion 
of financial education. Its policy statement urges countries to improve the 
financial skills of their populations and to heighten consumer awareness of 
how financial assets protect individuals against risk: it encourages regulators to 
embark on this task early in people’s lives and to intervene when individuals 
are economically vulnerable (OECD 2005b: II.A.8–10). 
 
C. REGULATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
1. Decentered Regulation 
 
Financial firms’ support for state initiatives to enhance financial literacy 
responds to and reinforces changes in regulatory goals and techniques that 
have accompanied the rise of neoliberalism. Much contemporary re-regulation 
is decentered in the sense that governments do not monopolize regulatory 
power, but rather share it with international and regional organizations, 
independent agencies, industry and cross industry groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and individuals (Black 2001, 2002, 2003; Levi-Faur 2005; Scott 
2004). States may enlist new regulatory subjects, delegating governance 
powers and responsibilities for the performance of markets to firms and 
individuals that formerly were viewed as objects or beneficiaries of regulation. 
To use a popular metaphor, decentered regulation positions the state as 
“steering” rather than “rowing” (Osborne & Gaebler 1992: 25–48). It disperses 
governance capacity through meta-regulatory practices that constitute 
market actors as at once regulators and regulated. 4 
 
As Julia Black notes: 
 
“the normative aspect of the new understanding of regulation is that intervention 
in the self-regulation of social actors . . . has to be indirect” (Black 
2001: 126). 
 
This perspective on regulation opens up new possibilities for understanding 
how regulators view their work in relation to consumer interests (Ramsay 
2006). In particular it allows for them to position consumers not as passive 
recipients of regulatory protection but as subjects who actively contribute 
to regulatory practice. Both the empowerment rationale for the new financial 
literacy education mandates and the responsibilization thesis provide 
justifications for decentered regulation. Each depicts the financial consumer 
as a potentially influential market actor, with the former emphasizing 
spontaneous ordering through the invisible hand of privately held preferences, 
while responsibilization conceives of the consumer’s ordering role as strategic 
and deliberately constructed by the state. 
 
2. Financial Education as Consumer Empowerment 
 
According to the economic model of financial education as consumer 
empowerment, increased supply of financial products potentially has the 
effect of widening and deepening consumer markets. At the same time, 
substantial growth in the number and range of financial offerings may create 
problems for consumers since it increases complexity and the risk of the 
market circulating poor-quality or unusable information. Reliance on 
inadequate information threatens consumers’ interests, especially their 
interests in financial products supplied under long-term contracts or which 
require individuals to cede management of their assets to decision makers 
whom they do not directly control. Uncertainty and asymmetry may impede 
entry to financial markets for some consumers, through self-selection, or 
because financial firms selectively market their products (Devlin 2005; Ford 
& Rowlingson 1996; Leyshon & Thrift 1995). Among consumers who do 
enter financial markets, the adverse consequences of inadequate information 
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range from buyers’ remorse, through significant economic loss from unsuitable 
products, to financial ruin for some victims of exploitative marketing or 
fraud. Disclosure and reflection rights appear as initial responses to such 
risks, whereas financial literacy education purports to strengthen the capacity 
of these rights to protect consumers (Reifner & Herwig 2003). 
 
These regulatory responses assume a strong notion of consumer sovereignty, 
in which the consumer appears as a rational actor whose unique and robust 
preferences about personal welfare policymakers respect and seek to facilitate. 
More than a simple claim about human agency, this notion of consumer 
sovereignty also informs the understanding that consumer demand directs 
producers as to how much of which products to supply. According to this 
model, poor-quality and inaccessible information jeopardizes the reign of 
the sovereign consumer because it impairs her ability to realize her preferences. 
Knowing that inadequate information may have such consequences, 
producers have incentives to obfuscate or withhold relevant facts when so 
doing shifts control to them. As long as other critical assumptions of strong 
consumer sovereignty remain intact, however, this model offers little scope 
for regulatory intervention to influence the substance of consumers’ tastes; 
its central concern is how consumers decide. Educational measures that 
attempt to modify consumer preferences for financial products, by contrast, 
depart from standard economic rationales for regulating consumer markets, 
rendering consumer sovereignty a questionable justification for policy.5 
 
3.Responsibilization of the Financial Consumer 
 
Responsibilization features in contemporary scholarship as a characteristic 
strategy of regulation in “late modern” societies, a strategy by which the state 
reconstructs its role from one of direct action on social welfare and personal 
security to that of “governance-at-a-distance” (Garland 1996: 454; Rose 1999). 
 
Responsibilization imposes new demands on individuals to regulate their 
conduct—and often that of other people—to maintain their well-being. It 
thereby reproduces a distinct conception of the human actor as “an entrepreneur 
of his or her self” (Rose 1999: 144) whose lifelong work is “to make adequate 
provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one’s human 
capital” (Rose 1999: 142 fn 13, quoting Gordon 1991: 44). Off-loading obligations 
for social provisioning does not detach the state from social ordering but 
rather creates opportunities for it to exercise power differently, to function as 
coordinator and catalyst, deploying distinctive knowledge, objectives, and 
governance techniques (Garland 1996: 454). Responsibilization thus demands 
an activist stance on the part of the state, which recasts its role from one of 
directly providing services and protection to fostering the institutional, 
social, and cultural conditions that support “entrepreneurship of the self.” 
Responsibilization may be linked to the growth of regulators’ financial 
literacy mandates in several ways. With the shift in the role of the state from 
“rowing” to “steering” on matters of social welfare, financial consumption may 
serve a site for responsibilization of individuals. Education orienting financial 
consumers towards self-reliance complements other policies such as incentives 
to make financial choices favored by the state, cutting collective services, and 
creating liability regimes that limit the protection consumers receive against 
mis-selling. In this way, financial literacy education may help to sustain a 
conception of the financial consumer as a responsible self-regulating subject 
who does not look to the state for more help than it is willing to provide. 
Beyond managing the business of her own life, the work of the responsibilized 
consumer extends to regulating the behavior of firms and the performance of 
markets. Literate, skilled consumers are expected to search the market effectively, 
monitor firms attentively, switch providers efficiently, and exercise their consumer 
power to drive out of the market firms that are dishonest, incompetent, or 
indifferent to consumers’ needs. Through making choices that reward or 
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punish firms appropriately, the educated and responsible consumer may become 
a resource available for regulators to enlist in the project of improving the 
competitive health of financial markets, nationally and in the global arena.6 
 
Lastly, financial education that purports to enhance the responsible 
consumer’s capacities to regulate herself and other market actors may 
provide a justification for the state to reduce its investment in patrolling 
financial markets and monitoring financial firms, in effect relieving regulators 
of some of their responsibility for the state of the market. 
 
III. FINANCIAL LITERACY POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UK AND CANADA 
 
A. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 
 
In the UK, the regulatory mandate to promote financial literacy stems from 
a comprehensive overhaul of financial market governance that began in 
1997. Reforms to the regulatory architecture of the markets developed in 
response to financial industry restructuring processes that had blurred 
distinctions between different kinds of financial services businesses (Great 
Britain. Treasury 1998: 8). Mergers and acquisitions as well as internal firm 
growth produced multi-sector financial firms. Industry restructuring also 
brought new entrants into the market as supermarkets and other non-financial 
retailers began to offer financial products (Briault 1999; Great Britain. 
Treasury 1998). 
 
These developments created intractable problems of “communication, coordination, 
co-operation and consistency” that the regulators failed to solve 
(Briault 1999: 15). After a ten-year period that witnessed spectacular disasters 
in financial markets, including bank failures and widespread mis-selling of 
financial products, the government concluded that its regulatory model 
could not adequately protect investors (Great Britain. Treasury 1998: 8). 
Breaking with its past system of sectoral regulation, the government constituted 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) as the “single” statutory regulator 
for the financial services industry.7 Its regulatory powers cover business 
practices and prudential regulation, and it governs a wide range of financial 
products and markets. 
 
The combination of prudential regulation and market conduct regulation 
makes the FSA’s jurisdiction distinctive even among the emerging breed of 
“single market” regulators (Black 2005), but it does not regulate all financial 
services. In particular, much of the consumer credit market remains under 
the jurisdictions of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (FSA & OFT 2006). Moreover the FSA’s 
consumer educational remit is not exclusive but overlaps with the educational 
mandates of several other agencies and government departments, including 
the OFT, the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), the Department 
for Work and Pensions, and the Treasury. For most financial products and 
markets, however, the FSA plays the lead role in stimulating and sponsoring 
the development of financial literacy initiatives, although it may devolve 
delivery to other agencies. 
 
Promotion of “public understanding of the financial system” is one of four 
regulatory objectives of the FSA established in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), which came into force at the end of 2001. This 
objective includes heightening awareness of the risks and benefits of financial 
products and providing appropriate information and advice. (FSMA: s4) 
Another statutory objective, consumer protection, defined in terms of 
“securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers” (FSMA: s5(1)), 
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Elaborating on factors relevant to determining an “appropriate 
degree” of consumer protection, the Act directs the FSA to consider variations 
in consumers’ experience and expertise and the “caveat emptor” principle, 
that “consumers should take responsibility for their decisions” (FSMA: 
s5(2)(d)). During committee hearings on the draft Bill, members questioned 
representatives of the government and FSA about the rationale for defining 
consumer protection goals in terms ofcaveat emptor n markets for 
complex and unfamiliar products such as financial services (Joint Committee 
1999: q24 & q101). Its inclusion was defended by the government, however, 
on the basis that: “we do not want . . . consumers [to] believe that wherever 
they put their money and whatever decisions they make they will always be 
protected. They will need to have that responsibility for the decisions they 
make” (Great Britain. Joint Committee 1999: q101). This perspective on 
consumer protection reappears in the FSA’s subsequent positioning of 
consumer responsibility at the heart of its financial literacy strategy. 
Conceiving of its statutory education mandate as a new departure for a 
UK financial market regulator, the FSA embarked on a policy-development 
process early in the transition to the new regulatory regime (Great Britain. 
FSA 1998, 1999). Initially, it conceptualized financial illiteracy primarily in 
terms of ineffective consumer decision making. A 1998 consultation paper, 
for example, quotes a Treasury minister’s description of the purposes of 
financial education as to “ensure that consumers have the ability to understand 
and question the advice and literature they are given . . . help empower 
consumers and enable them to use their ‘buying power’ more effectively” 
(Great Britain. FSA 1998: 1). The consultation paper links financial literacy 
education to the FSA’s market governance powers with the proposition that 
consumer education “could also, over time, reduce the need for detailed 
intervention”9 but dismisses the possibility with the assertion that regulatory 
action remains necessary to maintain “adequate standards of consumer 
protection” (Great Britain. FSA 1998: 1.3). 
 
This model of financial literacy education as helping consumers more 
effectively to act on their preferences survived the initial consultations. While 
a 1999 report makes reference to themes consistent with responsibilization 
of consumers—such as improving national competitiveness and the need for 
consumers to inform themselves and understand their responsibilities as 
well as their rights (Great Britain. FSA 1999: 3.5 & 3.7)—it does not advocate 
financial literacy education to reduce market regulation. Moreover, it explicitly 
rejects notions of consumer education being used to expand financial markets 
(Great Britain. FSA 1999: 3.21) and of the agency “being prescriptive . . . or 
telling people to save” (Great Britain. FSA 1999: 3.8), characterizing financial 
literacy education instead as a resource that enables financial consumers to 
achieve whatever they choose as their goals. In the words of the report: “the 
high level aim of consumer education is to help consumers make informed 
financial choices” (Great Britain. FSA 1999: 3.5). To this end, the 1999 
strategy consisted of two main prongs: (a) skills development to enhance 
individuals’ abilities to manage their finances; and (b) better access to 
impartial information and advice (Great Britain. FSA 1999: 3.7 & 3.8). 
The model of consumer education empowering individuals to make effective 
financial choices sufficed to launch the FSA’s financial literacy project, which 
in its first few years commissioned several research studies, established an 
extensive network of consumer education partners in public and private 
sectors, and published a vast number of documents proffering information 
and advice. Policy development continued, however, not only on financial 
literacy education, where the FSA has collaborated with other agencies to 
refine its conception of consumer education, but also in relation to the agency’s 
other statutory objectives and its approach to market regulation (Great 
Britain. FSA 2000). Since 1999, the FSA has integrated its public awareness 
objective into its risk-based regulatory model (Great Britain. FSA 2000, 2002a, 
2003b), a framework for regulatory action in which regulators “attempt to 
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define what, to their minds, are the acceptable limits of their responsibility 
and hence accountability” (Black 2005: 514). With the development of this 
model, the FSA’s view of the objectives of consumer education has come to 
conform more closely to the responsibilization thesis. 
 
Recent policy documents restate the FSA’s public awareness objective as 
making financial consumers more “confident and capable” of participating 
in financial markets (e.g., Great Britain. FSA 2003c, 2006d). While the 
difference between “capable” and “effective” consumers may seem more 
semantic than material, the new model represents the rationales for financial 
literacy in ways that correspond more closely than before to a construction 
of the responsibilized consumer as a regulatory subject. Noting that “the 
comforting arms of the state, and of employers, are steadily being withdrawn” 
and that “the responsibilities that individuals face are significant and growing” 
(Great Britain. FSA 2006b: 2), the FSA envisages “confident and capable” 
consumers understanding their financial needs in new ways, a change that 
should manifest itself in different attitudes and preferences as well as behaviours 
(Great Britain. Basic Skills Agency & FSA 2003; FSA 2003a, 2003c, 2006b, 
2006c, 2006d). 
 
Accordingly, educational interventions should not only influence how 
individuals make decisions but also alter consumers’ consciousness of their 
interests, particularly their interests in financial planning (Great Britain. 
FSA 2005c, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). Once convinced of the need to plan 
ahead and equipped to “exercise a stronger influence in markets; to take 
greater responsibility for their own actions; and to protect themselves through 
less mis-buying and being less susceptible to mis-selling” (Great Britain. 
FSA 2005a: 29, 2005b: 23), financially capable consumers should lessen the 
need for regulatory intervention and “possibly reduce the burden on firms” 
(Great Britain. FSA 2003c: 9, 2006c: 22). They also should lower the social 
costs of what the FSA regards as irresponsible individual decision making, 
especially the social costs of failure to plan for retirement, and of diverting 
resources away from more productive uses into managing individuals’ 
financial crises (Great Britain. FSA 2006c: 22). 
 
Responsibilization of the consumer mirrors another FSA strategy to 
encourage financial firms to act responsibly when dealing with consumers. 
(e.g., FSA 2001, 2006e). Sometimes the agency represents itself as calibrating 
interactions between these normative frameworks as when it states that: 
 
“we are aware of the importance of maintaining a balance between customers’ 
needs and their responsibilities, firms’ duties and their reasonable expectations 
of customers” (Great Britain. FSA 2005b: 25). Taken as a whole, the FSA’s 
model financial consumer comports well with its regulatory preference “to 
work with the grain of the market and facilitate market-led solutions” 
(Great Britain. FSA 2005a: 17). 
 
After almost three years of research, strategic planning, and experimentation 
through pilot studies and piecemeal initiatives, the FSA launched the 
implementation stage of its National Strategy for Financial Capability in 
March 2006, budgeting £10 million for the first year of work (Great Britain. 
FSA 2006b). Responding to findings from its first large-scale survey of 
financial literacy skills in the UK population, the FSA identifies poor financial 
planning habits, inadequate knowledge of financial matters, and weak 
decision-making skills when choosing financial products as significant consumer 
flaws that have potentially damaging consequences for the economy, as well 
as the affected individuals (Great Britain. FSA 2006c: 22). It finds also that 
after reallocating responsibility for economic security among individuals, 
the state, and employers, contemporary society now demands the most 
sophisticated financial decision making from its least experienced and capable 
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financial consumers—the under-40s (Great Britain. FSA 2006c). Young adults, 
students, and children therefore feature prominently among those targeted 
for capability enhancement under the Strategy’s seven major projects. 
These projects include 
Learning Money Matters, a joint initiative of the FSA and the industry-sponsored 
Personal Finance Education Group, which will receive more than £15 million over five years to 
provide financial education to 1.8 million students in 4,000 primary and secondary schools. 
This scheme builds on earlier work with education policy makers to increase the 
prominence of personal financial education within schools, through strategies 
such as its integration into national curricula (Great Britain. FSA2006a, 
2006b). Helping Young Adults make sense of money, a new FSA sponsored 
program to be delivered through higher education institutions and by 
voluntary organizations working with NEET youth (not in education, 
employment, or training), anticipates take-up by 3.4 million young adults 
(Great Britain. FSA 2006b). At least 1.5 million new parents will receive 
Money Box, which combines financial information and tools for adults with 
materials to “reinforce the financial capability message” in young children 
(Great Britain. FSA 2006b: 17): four million workers will learn to Make the 
most of your money by participating in FSA sponsored workplace seminars 
on topics such as budgeting, debt, and financial planning. 
 
Other elements of the Strategy involve promoting the FSA’s online financial 
management tools, which purport to “build consumer confidence and motivate 
them into taking action” (Great Britain. FSA 2006b: 14), and implementing 
an engaging communications strategy “to position the FSA . . . as 
the place to turn for impartial, general information on financial products and services” 
(Great Britain. FSA 2006b: 12). Having spent £2 million on consumer 
communications during 2005–06, including its high profile “laid bare” 
campaigns on money and mortgages,10 the FSA plans to spend a similar 
amount in 2006–07 on a new consumer website and materials and it has set a 
three-year goal of doubling annual web visits from two to four million (Great 
Britain. FSA 2006b: 12). The FSA also finances small-scale, experimental 
activities to enhance financial capability through an innovation fund that last 
year split £200,000 among twelve voluntary organizations (Great Britain. 
FSA 2006d: 26). 
 
The FSA intends the Strategy to reach at least ten million people in the 
UK (Great Britain. FSA 2006d: 26). As well as monitoring and evaluating 
specific programs, the agency plans to assess progress towards improving 
consumers’ financial capability by repeating its large-scale survey at regular 
intervals (Great Britain. FSA 2006c). It expects that “sustained and relentless 
implementation” of its program will produce a measurable “step change” in 
consumers’ financial skills within five years (Great Britain. FSA 2006c: 5). 
Over the last eight years of policy development the FSA has developed its 
public awareness mandate as a means to communicate expectations that 
“consumers should take responsibility for their decisions,” the caveat emptor 
principle.11 This communicative process orients financial market regulation 
towards changing how consumers understand and respond to the risks of 
consuming some types of financial products and of failing to consume 
others. Consumer vulnerability to mis-selling becomes a matter of consumer 
imprudence, a risk that is most effectively controlled by consumers acquiring 
“the basic knowledge and confidence to ask the right questions and to seek 
out the best products or the ones which suit them best” (Cruickshank 2000: 
4.127). Through enhancement of consumer financial capability, the FSA 
may help individuals to identify needs and learn how to seize opportunities 
and manage risks, but it locates responsibility for meeting needs and avoiding 
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B. THE FINANCIAL CONSUMER AGENCY OF CANADA 
 
The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) is a much smaller 
organization than the FSA, created to close a perceived gap in the governance 
of financial services market rather than to replace institutions perceived to 
have failed. If the UK’s regulatory system is characterized by an appearance 
of convergence, Canada’s is highly fragmented, splitting regulation of financial 
markets and firms between federal and provincial/territorial levels of 
government, and delegating governance authority according to regulatory 
task and market sector. Recent years have witnessed calls for consolidation 
of financial market regulation, but the fragmentation that spurred such 
demands also hinders reform (Wise Persons’ Committee 2003; Canada. 
Senate Committee on Banking 2006). Because critical financial markets and 
services lie outside federal jurisdiction, changes to their governance nationally 
may entail lengthy and complex negotiations among federal, provincial and 
territorial governments, regulators, and nongovernmental “stakeholders,” 
and require brokering by expert actors positioned as standing above the political 
fray (e.g., Stromberg 1995, 1998; Wise Persons’ Committee 2003). 
One such expert body, The Task Force on the Future of the Canadian 
Financial Services Sector, functioned as a catalyst for the creation of the 
FCAC. Its research showed that consumer protection in Canada’s financial 
markets significantly lagged behind comparable jurisdictions in its substantive 
norms, particularly those concerning transparency and disclosure, and 
provisions for consumer redress (Canada. Department of Finance 1998; 
Kerton 1998). Concluding, somewhat complacently, that the regulation of 
Canada’s financial services markets is basically sound,12 except for some minor 
shortcomings in consumer rights and remedies, the task force nevertheless 
recommended the appointment of a single regulator responsible for enforcing 
the consumer protection obligations of federally regulated financial firms 
(Canada. Department of Finance 1998). 
 
The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act established the agency 
in 2001, giving it an unequivocal remit to advance the interests of financial 
consumers, but granting limited regulatory powers. Unable to make conductof- 
business rules for federally regulated firms, the FCAC’s consumer 
protection mandate consists of overseeing such firms’ compliance with federal, 
voluntary, and self-regulatory consumer protection measures (FCAC Act: 
s3(2)(a)–(c)). Its consumer education powers appear in two statutory objects: one 
focused specifically on consumer awareness of financial firms’ duties under 
federal law (FCAC Act: s3(2)(d)), the other creating a mandate to “foster 
an understanding of financial services and issues” in collaboration with 
public and private sector organizations (FCAC Act: s3(2)(e)). Unlike the 
FSA, the FCAC does not regulate securities and investment markets, which 
are under provincial/territorial jurisdiction, but its consumer educational remit 
under s3(2)(e) extends to all financial markets, including those regulated by 
provinces and territories. 
 
Although its educational mandate is worded as broadly as that of the 
FSA, the FCAC operates on a much smaller scale. Its 2005 budget of Can$7.7 
million for the entire agency, for example, amounts to little more than one-third 
of the £10 million that the FSA will spend in 2006–07 solely on financial 
capability (FCAC 2005c; FSA 2006b). Unsurprisingly given its poor funding, 
development of the FCAC’s consumer education policy has proceeded in a 
low-key fashion. While the agency reports some interesting initiatives, such 
as founding an international forum on consumer protection and education 
(FCAC 2003: 17; Fowlie 2003), it has not comprehensively surveyed consumers’ 
financial literacy needs (OECD 2005a),13 or published consultation documents 
or position papers articulating its policy goals. Directions for its work 
appear to have been set through discussion with selected stakeholders and 
analysis of problems reported through consumer contacts with the agency 
(FCAC 2004, 2005b). 
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Corporate documents and educational resources shed some light on the 
FCAC’s interpretation of the role and objectives of consumer education, 
illuminating the pursuit of both facilitative and more overtly normative goals, 
with the former featuring more prominently than the latter. Annual reports 
equate the agency’s educational activities with the delivery of reliable 
information, and to a lesser extent objective advice, to consumers seen as 
capable of making wise choices (FCAC 2005b: 3). Only vulnerable and 
disadvantaged consumers are thought likely to benefit from more intensive 
interventions to modify their preferences or upgrade skills and such “special 
needs” are framed largely in terms of general, rather than specifically financial, 
literacy skills (FCAC 2003: 9, 2004: 15, 2005a: 9). Other financial consumers, 
by contrast, are represented as ready and willing to be responsible but lacking 
relevant facts (FCAC 2003: 5; FCAC 2004: 7). Educating consumers thus 
consists of supplying useful, timely, and accurate information, which “empower[s] 
them to make the right decisions” (FCAC 2002: 9). 
 
This conception of consumer education represents the FCAC as an enabler 
of choice for individuals who know generally what they want to accomplish— 
and how to achieve it, positioning the agency as direct supplier of credible 
information that firms do not reliably provide. When facilitating consumer 
choice in this way, the FCAC sees itself as empowering people to participate 
in important decisions about their financial well-being and by this means 
“contributing strongly to widespread citizen engagement” (FCAC 2003: 5). 
In addition to supplying missing information, the FCAC engages in a more 
normative project of consumer regulation when its educational materials 
instruct consumers on their responsibilities to “make sure you get the best deal 
possible,”14 “talk to your financial institution,” “[s]tay up to date by reading 
articles, publications and on-line information,” and comparison shop.15 
 
Such materials represent the responsible financial consumer as “a smart, safe user of 
financial services,”16 whose informed financial decisions improve competitive 
discipline (FCAC 2003: 11). The FCAC’s “smart, safe user” resembles the 
FSA’s “confident and capable consumer,” in being well-informed, able to 
discipline firms who supply shoddy financial products, and willing to embrace 
responsibility for her own financial choices. Assumption of risk features far 
less prominently in the decisions of the Canadian “smart safe user,” however, 
whose expectations of the regulator are not explicitly limited by the 
caveat emptor norm or by attempts to manage the risk of blame for regulatory failure.17 
As a supplier of educational materials, the FCAC is but one of many 
 
Canadian organizations that target financial literacy skills. Banks, mutual 
funds, and industry groups offer their own educational programming, while 
provincial/territorial regulators publish extensive websites featuring consumer 
information and advice and promoting responsible financial consumption 
(e.g., CBA 2006; CSA 2006; Investor Education Fund 2006). Federal 
government departments and agencies other than the FCAC produce 
educational material, as do nongovernmental organizations working in the 
areas of individual asset-building and debt-management (Canada. Senate 
Committee on Banking 2006: 55–58). Market expansion themes and anxieties 
about consumer attitudes towards investment feature prominently in descriptions 
of public and private financial education programs, especially those 
directed at retirement planning and at women (Condon 2006; Harmes 2001; 
Stromberg 1998). 
 
Many of these programs pre-date the FCAC and are delivered without its 
assistance, raising questions about the purpose of the agency’s educational 
mandate and more generally about the role of the Canadian state in fostering 
financial literacy. Policy makers recently discussed the latter question at a 
National Symposium on “financial capability,” which was co-sponsored by 
the FCAC and attended by internationally prominent advocates of financial 
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literacy education as regulatory project, including the OECD, the FSA, and 
the US Federal Reserve Board. Reports of the event illustrate differing views. 
Some continue to claim that the financial literacy needs of most Canadian 
consumers currently are well served by firms and existing institutional 
supports, with only a minority of disadvantaged individuals needing support 
from the state to improve their financial literacy skills (Sykes 2005: 62). 
Others reject the bifurcated model claiming that most consumers—not only 
the socially disadvantaged or financially excluded—lack the skills to manage 
their financial affairs effectively, especially in the wake of social policies 
that have substantially individualized responsibility for economic security 
(Canada & SEDI 2006). 
 
A 2006 report on the symposium and its implications for policy recommends 
that the government respond to consumers’ skills deficiencies by creating 
“an enabling environment” for consumer financial capability (Canada & SEDI 
2006: 1). Defining financial capability as consisting of “knowledge and 
understanding,” “skills and competence,” and “financial responsibility” 
(Canada & SEDI 2006: 4), the report envisages regulatory agencies including 
the FCAC, playing an important role in fostering an enabling environment, 
but mostly through “steering” rather than “rowing.” Specifically, it proposes 
that government agencies should facilitate “stakeholder dialogue,” fund 
research and innovation and integrate financial capability into their policies 
and programming while responsibility for program design and direct delivery 
of knowledge, skills, and responsible attitudes should remain with the private 
for-profit and non-profit sectors (Canada & SEDI 2006: 2). 
 
Additional support for increased state involvement in promoting financial 
education appears in a June 2006 Senate committee report, which recommends 
increased funding for the FCAC, development of model financial skills 
curricula for all phases of lifelong learning, more research into consumers’ 
financial literacy needs and better monitoring and evaluation of programmeprogram 
effectiveness (Canada. Senate Committee on Banking 2006). Proposals 
such as these may heighten expectations that Canadian policymakers 
will increase the national government’s role in financial literacy education 
to conform to the direction set by the OECD and perceived comparator 
states such as the UK, the US, and Australia (e.g., Sykes 2005: 63). Large 
financial firms are very powerful actors in Canadian politics, however; and 
having marketed their own investor and consumer educational programs 
for years, they may not be convinced that FCAC’s educational activities 
significantly further their interests. Moreover, the centrifugal tendencies of 
Canada’s federal-provincial/territorial arrangements remain strong in the 
financial services sector so that proposals to strengthen a national regulator 
may be contested. Under these conditions, substantial growth of the FCAC’s 
educational project may not occur unless firms believe that public financial 
education advances their interests in expanding demand for their products 
or in forestalling less palatable forms of consumer protection regulation. 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS 
 
A. CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL 
LITERACY EDUCATION 
 
As they have developed policy pursuant to their statutory mandates to 
improve financial literacy skills, both the UK and Canadian regulators have 
consistently represented financial education as empowering consumers to 
become more effective decision makers. Neither agency, however, perceives 
its role as confined to supplying information that the market fails to generate. 
More evidence to support this finding appears in the FSA’s policy texts than 
in those of the FCAC. Even the latter’s limited program of work, however, 
embodies an implicit normative ordering of responsible behaviour by the 
“smart, safe” financial consumer. 
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Through the elaboration of its public education mandate, the FSA has 
sketched a bold vision of the purposes of financial literacy skills and the 
relative responsibilities of consumers, firms, and the statutory regulator for 
the performance of financial markets and the protection of consumers. 
Acknowledging the limitations of unskilled consumer decision-making as a 
regulatory tool, the FSA nonetheless imagines the possibility of equipping 
consumers with the necessary confidence, habits and skills to expand their 
usage of financial products, navigate financial markets successfully and 
perform as a self-regulating regulatory actor. It also values financial capability 
enhancement as potentially dampening consumer expectations about the FSA’s 
capacity to regulate the market, expectations that the agency has tried to 
control by limiting its own responsibility for the risks that consumers encounter. 
With the deployment of consumer education as a form of consumer 
meta-regulation, the FSA positions the “confident and capable consumer” 
as a market actor whose decisions pressuring firms to innovate, compete, 
and “treat consumers fairly”, help to decenter the statutory regulator. 
As noted above, however, a decentered regulator is not necessarily 
disempowered. Financial literacy projects such as that of the FSA rest, at 
least in part, on the premise that without its intervention, consumers’ 
preferences may be as flawed as the information on which they often rely. 
Wrong or misguided preferences do not advance what regulators conceive 
to be consumers’ material interests in the “business of life.” Moreover, faulty 
consumer preferences send the wrong signals to markets, distorting firms’ 
incentives to innovate and compete. Left uncorrected, flawed preferences 
may become political demands for the state to resume responsibility for 
individuals’ social and economic welfare, in effect, to return to “rowing” 
rather than “steering” (Great Britain. FSA 2006c: 22). 
 
When using education to mold consumer preferences, regulators appear 
to reverse the idea of market failure posing a risk to consumer welfare, 
focussing instead on the risk of consumer “failure” jeopardizing the health 
of financial markets. Responding to this latter risk, regulators may exercise 
power in ways that conflict with standard descriptive and normative economic 
claims about the exogeneity of consumer preferences. Responsibilized 
consumers may be intended to regulate themselves and govern the market, 
but they are not wholly sovereign in the sense of possessing autonomous 
preferences reflective of a unique, private conception of personal welfare. 
Instead, their goals as well as their behavior are to be fashioned by reference 
to states’ interests in economic development and in the competitiveness of 
domestic economies in global financial markets (e.g., Great Britain. DTI 
2002, 2005). 
 
Although a range of scholarly literatures dispute claims of the liberal state’s 
indifference towards consumer preferences (e.g., Benería 1999; Hodgson 
1999; Polanyi 2001) assumptions that the state does not interfere with 
individuals’ choices continue to influence policy on the regulation of consumer 
markets (Howells 2005). Indications that regulators treat preferences as 
malleable therefore raise questions about the policy and politics of financial 
education as a regulatory practice. One question concerns the ideological 
dimension of using individual educated choice in place of direct delivery of 
social welfare. In terms of relationships between the individual and the state, 
liberalism offers no clear justification for why a state willing to persuade 
individuals to embrace responsibility for their own financial security rejects 
collective provision funded through compulsory social insurance. The first 
instrument purports to mold individual choices, the second to override 
them. Neither treats consumers as wholly autonomous and the former is 
more intrusive. Moreover, vigorous promotion of entrepreneurialism of the 
self may contribute to the erosion of solidarity as an animating principle of 
social policy. Impressed from their earliest days at home and in school with 
beliefs that individuals should manage their financial affairs responsibly, 
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relying on private wealth for protection against risk and to fund personal 
development, future generations may find it difficult to comprehend arguments 
for the pooling of resources to support those perceived to have failed in the 
“business of life.” 
 
Conversely, financial literacy education may potentially offer opportunities 
to challenge conventional understandings of the goals that consumers ought 
to pursue. Some regulators incorporate broad notions of consumer citizenship 
into their financial literacy activities and differing priorities appear in states 
that have already embarked on financial literacy education. Regulators in 
countries of the North, for example, promote responsible usage of consumer 
credit, but typically do not use financial literacy education to counteract 
credit-fuelled spending, presumably because of the prominent role such 
spending plays in how those states measure economic performance. In this 
context, education about the management of debt may serve to preserve 
individuals’ consumer spending once employment income has stopped. South 
Africa’s financial regulator, by contrast, describes “negat[ing] the social status 
attached to consumption” as a central element of its consumer education 
strategy (South Africa. Financial Services Board 2001: 11), an approach that 
potentially may undermine contemporary consumption-driven economic 
indicators. 
 
Nor should one overlook the capacity of financial education to provide a 
setting in which to articulate alternative visions of financial justice and thus 
potentially open up new ways to participate in action for social and economic 
change. Although in some respects emblematic of the pursuit of individual 
self-interest, money matters are also indelibly social (Zelizer 1994). Financial 
consumption is deeply embedded in social relations of care and dependence, 
and the standardization of money as the medium of exchange creates a 
vocabulary for shared understandings of how local, national, and global 
conditions make manifest the risks and vulnerabilities of economic inequality. 
Financial literacy provides a language and a focus for engagement with 
financial markets and as such potentially may offer “model mongers” of civil 
society a means to stimulate consumer expressions of solidarity and ethical 
commitments around financial justice and economic relations (Braithwaite 
& Drahos 2000; Barnett et al. 2005). 
 
B. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND THE LIMITS OF LEARNING 
 
Another set of questions posed by financial literacy education concerns the 
feasibility of its regulatory aspects, no matter how contests over consumer 
sovereignty may unfold. Research on the limits of human rationality, and 
on literacies and learning exposes some of the challenges of trying to inculcate 
in consumers the habits, skills, and tastes of the responsible financial shopper. 
Consumer learning may be even more difficult to accomplish than regulators 
acknowledge because of firms’ interests in exploiting ways in which consumer 
behavior routinely departs from the assumptions of rationality assumptions 
of economic theory. Moreover, learning is a reconstitutive process that 
engages individual agency and as such, its results may be highly unpredictable. 
Attempts to responsibilize financial consumers as self-regulating regulatory 
subjects equipped to govern the market thus may founder on the unwillingness 
of firms to subordinate their interests to those of consumers and the sheer 
ungovernability of consumer decision making. 
 
Behavioral research identifies several reasoning biases that generally prevent 
consumers from giving effect rationally to their preferences even when they 
have access to relevant information. Of most significance to the regulatory 
project of financial literacy education are those biases that cause consumer 
behavior to conflict with the assumption that individuals possess stable, 
transitive preferences that do not vary with the circumstances in which 
consumers make their decisions. Experimental studies have shown, repeatedly, 
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that individuals select differently from among the same options depending 
on the context of their choice and how it is “framed” (Bowles 1998; Hanson 
& Kysar 1999; Rabin 1998). 
 
Studies document inconsistent preferences in a wide range of different 
settings from voting to healthcare decisions to financial services and some 
show the persistence of inconsistencies even after individuals have been 
alerted to them (e.g., Benartzi & Thaler 1999; Kahneman & Tversky 2000). 
These robust findings indicate that framing effects taken alone may powerfully 
influence consumer decisions and they may, in addition, interact with other 
cognitive limitations to influence consumer choices and responses to 
information remedies (Hanson & Kysar 1999: 685). Anchoring effects or 
“confirmatory biases,” for example, imbue individuals with unwarranted 
confidence in their judgments such that they fail rationally to interpret 
conflicting evidence while the availability bias leads individuals to give 
disproportionate weight to vivid information, in effect to find it more 
meaningful than abstract information of higher quality and greater accuracy.18 
 
One predictable effect of anchoring is to dilute the protective effects of 
reflection rights, since consumers who are already convinced of the suitability 
and quality of financial products they have acquired are unlikely to devote 
reflection time to rethinking their choice. The availability bias similarly may 
reduce the impact of statutory disclosure rights when firms remain free to 
circulate their own promotional messages in more vivid and memorable 
form than the facts that law requires them to supply. 
 
Cognitive limitations create incentives for financial firms to pursue increased 
profits by systematically attempting to manipulate consumer behavior. Firms 
adopting such strategies need not attempt to change consumer preferences 
since they can achieve their goals through product marketing that elicits 
and exploits inconsistencies in consumers’ decisions and communications 
that deflect information remedies. Once some firms deploy practices 
that take advantage of cognitive frailties, then competitive pressures 
likely will encourage others to follow, resulting in the structuring of market 
relations that subordinate the “money pump” consumer to the sovereign 
producer.19 Proponents of financial literacy education may assume that if firms can 
influence consumer decision-making processes so powerfully then financial 
educators also should be able to do so with well-designed interventions that 
are effectively delivered. Regulators’ educational initiatives, however, must 
contend with problems that do not trouble firms marketing their products, 
including the timing of feedback and a multiplicity of objectives that may 
produce ambiguous or contradictory lessons. According to Tversky and 
Kahneman, education neutralizes behavioral biases when the learner 
receives “accurate and immediate feedback about the relation between 
situational conditions and the appropriate response” (Tversky & Kahneman 
1987: 90). Neither formal educational activities nor informal learning 
experiences such as reading popular money advice literature, speaking with 
acquaintances, or shopping readily benefit from such conditions. Regulators’ 
attempts to enhance knowledge and decision-making skills may offer 
consumers valuable resources, but typically do not provide immediate and 
salient feedback on the relationship between a financial consumers’ decision 
and its consequences. Even successful financial education may have difficulty 
in demonstrating to consumers what they have gained. Better decision making 
skills and improved knowledge may reduce the risk of a consumer obtaining 
unsuitable financial products, for example, but a consumer who steers clear 
of such products may scarcely notice the benefits of her new skill because 
she never encounters the costs of obtaining an unsuitable product. Educators 
also face the challenge of attempting to teach relatively complex lessons. 
Whereas firms may wish simply to entice individuals to consume their products, 
financial educators purport to impart a mix of skills, personal attributes, 
and information that together will produce responsible, “confident and 
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In sum, behavioral scholarship shows that departures from the assumptions 
of rational decision-making are common, persistent, and difficult for education 
to correct. This literature suggests that in fast-changing markets that offer 
unlimited opportunities for manipulative marketing and rarely exhibit the 
conditions of effective learning, even the most intrusive consumer education 
programs may have difficulty changing how consumers decide. 
 
With respect to changing the preferences that consumers hold, scholarship 
on literacies, learning, and cultural meanings of the consumer highlights a 
need to interrogate assumptions about how consumers interact with learning 
whether the lessons derive from firms, regulators, or other interested actors. 
Besides its assumptions about consumer rationality, the regulatory project 
of financial literacy education generally assumes a level of predictability 
about what consumers learn. Equivalent assumptions about consumer 
manageability operate in other settings: As Gabriel and Lang point out, firms 
spend vast amounts of money in attempting to manage consumers through 
promotional communications and the collection and scrutiny of data on 
consumer behavior (Gabriel & Lang 1995). Consumer advocates worry about 
consumers’ vulnerability to monitoring and manipulation by firms and lobby 
for laws that will provide protection. Governments reporting economic 
performance in terms of consumer spending and anxious to reap the political 
benefits of popular enjoyment of consumption adopt macroeconomic policies 
designed to manage levels of consumer “confidence.” To some social critics 
the manageability of the consumer, together with the perceived triviality, 
emptiness, or destructiveness of consumption, compares unfavorably with 
the perceived resilience, commitments, and autonomy of their preferred 
sociopolitical identity of the citizen (Gabriel & Lang 1995). 
 
That so much time, effort and energy is dedicated to the project of 
managing consumers speaks to the significance of the iconic figure of the 
consumer in contemporary economies but the apparently unending 
nature of that project perhaps reveals more about its limitations than its 
possibilities. Gabriel and Lang’s work documents the complex, fragmented, 
and unruly nature of the consumer, a figure whose behavior may exhibit a 
wide range of contradictory traits. The same consumer may act in very 
different ways in similar or different settings for reasons that may be opaque 
and hence ungovernable. Integral to contemporary consumption, the 
“fragmentation, volatility and confusion” of consumer behavior suggests that 
consumers may accept or reject attempts to manage them at times and in 
ways that would-be managers cannot even predict, still less control (Gabriel 
& Lang 1995: 4). 
 
These characteristics of consumer behavior may influence the reception 
of financial literacy education, some aspects of which consumers may 
embrace even as they repudiate others. How consumers interpret the meanings 
of financial education and perceive its value depends on the social organization 
of consumption and the incentives or deterrents to exercising literacy 
skills in particular contexts: such interpretations and perceptions also 
may vary with different aspects of consumers’ identities. While some literacy 
initiatives by regulators respond to specific demographic (primarily age 
and gender) differences among financial consumers, their categories seem 
too limited and too rigid to contain the unruly complexity of consumer 
identities and the “vital unpredictability” of consumer behavior (Gabriel & 
Lang: 1995). 
 
Consumer responses to financial literacy education may be unpredictable 
and ungovernable for reasons other than resistance or the volatility of 
consumer behavior. Learning is not a simple process of feeding fresh inputs 
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into an individual’s intellectual database, modifying ingrained responses to 
stimuli, or adding new skills to an established cognitive foundation. Education 
is developmental and reconstitutive, centered less on what learners know or 
can do than on the remaking of the individual. This delicate and complex 
process may require shedding of old certainties and beliefs, development of 
a “capacity to unlearn and learn anew,” and the making of mistakes from 
which new learning occurs (Hodgson 1999: 75). How the remaking unfolds, 
moreover, is conditioned by the distinctive values, assumptions, and interpretive 
repertoires by which individuals make sense of their worlds. The same 
teaching on financial literacy, then, may produce very different lessons for 
one consumer than another. Contingent and variable in these and other 
ways, learning may not be conducive to the disciplined channeling of 
individual behavior embodied in the model financial consumer responsibilized 




To conclude that the consumer may not be governable in the ways that 
financial regulators envisage is not to deny that better financial literacy 
skills improve the experience of financial consumption or that some types of 
financial education may change some kinds of consumer behavior. This 
article has not sought to evaluate the effects of financial literacy education, 
but rather to investigate the purposes for which regulators may deploy it. 
Anxieties about levels of consumer spending and saving are not new, but the 
systematic expansion of financial literacy interventions by national regulators 
seems to be a distinctive contemporary development. Financial education, such 
as it is, traditionally has been delivered in private (familial, other personal, 
and commercial) settings, away from the state’s gaze. Its entry onto regulatory 
agendas across the globe marks a shift in how states conceive of their interests 
in individuals’ financial decisions. 
 
This article’s account of the development of the consumer education 
mandates of two financial regulators cautions against uncritical acceptance 
of claims that financial literacy education empowers consumers and advances 
their interests. Deficiencies in consumers’ financial skills have attracted 
regulators’ attention during an era when structural changes have greatly 
expanded the supply of financial products and made financial markets more 
volatile. In such a setting, the empowerment discourse of financial education 
may mask a more complicated regulatory project in which education of the 
consumer serves also to protect regulators and financial firms. Charged with 
managing her present consumption to provide for future needs and with 
driving out of the market firms that are dishonest, incompetent, or indifferent 
to consumer interests, the literate or capable financial consumer becomes 
responsibilized as a regulatory subject. This positioning of education as 
prophylactic against consumer incompetence assumes that financial 
consumers will embrace their new learning, modifying their behavior in positive 
and predictable ways. Studies documenting the unruliness and questionable 
rationality of consumer decision-making, however, suggest that this assumption 
may be quite unsafe. 
 
Further research in this area should investigate the spread of financial 
education mandates across different states, documenting differences as well 
as similarities in how regulators interpret and implement these mandates 
and the roles played by consumer groups and other non-state actors in both 
interpretation and implementation. Such a project might draw on and 
contribute to critical comparative scholarship on regulatory innovation and 
on the diffusion of regulatory technique under globalization (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000; Levi-Faur 2005; Moran 2003; Scott 2004). Other useful studies 
might interrogate the roles played by financial firms in advancing the financial 
literacy mandates of different states. This research might relate firms’ support 
for financial education to scholarship on the role of industry in regulatory 
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design and on changing conceptions of corporate social virtue (Vogel 2005). 
 
It also should compare large financial firms’ embrace of financial education 
with their responses to explicitly redistributional measures such as legal duties 
to serve the excluded or to reinvest in economically marginalized communities. 
Lastly, the use of financial literacy skills to differentiate consumers as 
warranting varying levels of intervention raises important questions about 
relationships between different forms of inequality and choice of regulatory 
technique. Policy makers—and financial firms—frequently target specific 
educational initiatives to consumers identified in terms of class or social/ 
financial exclusion, age, gender, race, and ethnicity, but there is little critical 
inquiry into how groups become constituted as in special need of financial 
education or the implications of such designation for consumers, regulators, and 
firms. Investigation of these questions may further illuminate the distributional 
aspects of the new regulation of consumer financial services. The novelty of 
consumer financial education, its recent and rapid dispersion among regulators 
in states differently placed in the global economy, and the unruly agency of 
its object/subject complicates analysis of these questions even as these same 
factors open up a rich agenda for critical research on financial literacy 
education as a regulatory practice. 
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globalization on domestic social welfare policies of wealthy states (Guillén 2001; 
Pierson 2001). 
3. Another firm that is prominent in advancing financial literacy is ANZ Bank in 
Australia, which has sponsored two large-scale adult financial literacy surveys 
and supported the work of the Australian Financial Literacy Task force. ANZ 
also runs extensive literacy programs inside and outside Australia and it recently 
commissioned a global benchmarking assessment of its financial literacy efforts 
(ANZ Bank 2006). 
4. Meta-regulation expresses the idea of regulating consumers by acting on their 
consciousness and of regulators using this governance of the consumer as a 
technique to regulate the market. This idea is analogous to Parker’s account of 
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makers’ concerns about “wise spending and saving” (Zelizer 1994). On the role 
of consumer sovereignty in contemporary consumer protection policy, see 
Cranston, Scott & Black (2000), and Ramsay (1989). 
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